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Abstract
This paper examines the empirical implications of Becker’s classical theory
of employer discrimination. If the male-female wage differential is due to em-
ployer discrimination, then non-discriminatory employers should hire more
women and enjoy a higher profit than discriminatory employers. This propo-
sition is tested using Japanese firm-level panel data from the 1990s. The
empirical results based on pooled OLS indicate that an increase in the pro-
portion of women employed by a firm enhances its operating profit. These
findings are strengthened based on a fixed effects estimation, and this result
implies that a firm-specific, time-constant, unobserved high profit factor is
negatively correlated with the employment of women. Although employing
10 percentage points more women increases profit by 2.9 percent according
to the fixed effects estimates, the cross-sectional estimates indicate almost
one-third of the effect because persistently high-profit firms hire fewer women
on average. This empirical evidence shows that employing more women in-
creases operating profit, but firms with a persistently high profit factor hire
fewer women. The effect of having a high female proportion of total work-
ers is found to be larger in concentrated industries, as implied by Becker’s
theory.
1 Introduction
Women’s average wage is lower than men’s average wage in many countries,
and the difference in average wages is very persistent. Researchers have been
discussing whether this difference reflects the male-female productivity differ-
ential or discrimination against women, which is defined as receiving a lower
wage than would be indicated by their productivity. Labor economists regu-
larly regress wage on proxies of productivity, such as educational background
or job experience, and examine the unexplained male-female wage gap. They
call the unexplained differential “residual discrimination” and typically at-
tribute the difference to sex discrimination. However, there are productivity
differences across persons that cannot be observed by econometricians, and
these differences may be systematically different across sexes. For example,
women with household responsibilities may be less productive in the work-
place and thus earn less than men, reflecting their lower productivity (See
Becker (1985) for this discussion). Therefore, obtaining a good measure of
workers’ productivity is very important for making “residual discrimination”
compelling evidence for sex discrimination. Labor economists have explored
better measures of productivity and produced significant research. Although
most of these studies have found evidence for sex discrimination, this evidence
is not necessarily definitive, since the perfect measure of each worker’s pro-
ductivity is anywhere from difficult to impossible to obtain. Consequently,
it is reasonable to claim that the “residual discrimination” method faces a
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big challenge. (See Altonji and Blank (1999) for a survey of the literature on
sex discrimination.)
To circumvent the limitation of the residual discrimination method, sev-
eral recent studies have implemented the “market test” to identify labor
market discrimination against minority workers. This method tests the em-
pirical implications of Becker (1971)’s employer discrimination hypothesis: If
majority and minority workers are equally productive but minority workers
are paid less, firms can earn more profit by hiring more minority workers. To
implement the idea, some measure of a firm’s profitability is regressed on the
minority employee proportion of the total number of employees. If discrim-
ination against women does not exist, then the female employee proportion
should not affect the firm’s profitability. On the other hand, if discrimination
exists, a higher minority proportion should increase profitability.1
Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (2002) implemented a market test of sex
discrimination using US manufacturing establishment data. They matched
the Decennial Census with the Census of Manufacturers and the Annual
Survey of Manufacturers by types of industry and location to construct es-
tablishment data that included detailed employee information such as fe-
male proportion. They found that, holding other variables constant, a 10
1The other recent method for overcoming the limitation of the residual method is the
estimation of production function that regards male and female labor as separate inputs.
Then the implied ratio of the female and male marginal product is compared with the ratio
of the female and male wage. Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999) found evidence
consistent with female discrimination using US establishment data, while Hellerstein and
Neumark (1999) did not find such evidence using Israeli data. Both papers are based on
cross-sectional estimates.
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percentage point increase in the female proportion increased the operation
income/sales ratio by 0.5 of a percentage point, while the average female pro-
portion and operation income/sales ratio were 28.6 percent and 23 percent
respectively. Their results were striking because they found a positive cor-
relation between high female proportion and high profitability among firms
with strong market power measured by a large product market share, but
this positive correlation was not found among firms without market power.
This result is consistent with Becker (1971)’s theory because only employ-
ers with market power can choose between earning higher profits and hiring
fewer women depending on their preference for discrimination.
Although their study made a path-breaking contribution to the literature,
there is still some room to improve upon it. As Altonji and Blank (1999)
point out in their review, it is crucial to consider the source of variation in
female employee proportion across firms. If the source of variation is the dif-
ference in the degree of discrimination against women across employers, then
the estimator obtained by Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (2002) appro-
priately tests the null hypothesis of no employer discrimination. However,
if production technology is heterogeneous across firms and each employer
chooses a proportion of female employees to maximize the firm’s profit, then
the heterogeneity in production technology that may directly affect the firm’s
profitability is correlated with female proportion. This possible endogeneity
of the female proportion makes Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (2002)’s
estimator biased, leading to a false rejection of the null hypothesis of no em-
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ployer discrimination. This endogeneity could have been circumvented by
using a fixed effects estimation, assuming each firm’s production technology
is time-constant, but they could not do this due to data limitations in the
US. In addition, the female proportion can be endogenous due to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act and the different degrees of law enforcement
across firm size. Holzer (1998) reported that larger firms hire disproportion-
ately more African American workers than smaller firms. He speculated both
stronger law enforcement for larger firms and the exemption of small firms
from law enforcement as reasons for his finding. If the same discussion ap-
plies to women, then larger firms that arguably enjoy high profitability may
hire disproportionately more women to comply with equal opportunity laws.
A series of studies by Ashenfelter and Hannan (1986), Black and Brainerd
(2001), and Black and Strahan (2001) also tested the implication of Becker
(1971)’s theory that severe market competition leaves less room for employers
to indulge their preference for discrimination, thus reducing discrimination
against women. Ashenfelter and Hannan (1986) found that banks located in
more competitive areas, indicated by a concentration of banks in a geographic
region, hire more women. Black and Brainerd (2001) observed that increased
imported products in an industry narrowed the male-female wage gap in
that industry during the 1980s in the US. In addition, Black and Strahan
(2001) showed that deregulation in the banking industry narrowed the male-
female wage gap, exploiting the different timing of deregulation across states
for identification. All of these papers consistently showed that competition
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reduces discrimination against women because employers in more competitive
industries have less room to indulge their preference for sex discrimination.
These studies essentially tested the hypothesis tested by the market test:
that employers have a choice between profit and discrimination only when
the market is not perfectly competitive.
Szymanski (2000) cleverly implemented a market test of racial discrim-
ination using data from the British Soccer League. He regressed a team’s
rank in the league on the proportion of black players among team players
and the wage bill to players. He found that teams with a higher propor-
tion of black players performed better, holding the wage bill to the players
constant. He used panel data to deal with time-constant, unobserved team
heterogeneity; thus any heterogeneity within a team that was correlated with
black player proportion, such as game style or unobserved difference in inputs
other than players, did not bias his market test as long as the heterogeneity
was time-constant.
This paper implements the market test for sex discrimination using Japanese,
firm-level panel data. The contributions of this paper to the literature are
threefold. First and most importantly, the panel data structure assures that
the market test will be free from heterogeneity bias. I do not claim that panel
data can make the test completely free of all biases, since it does not resolve
the simultaneity bias due to demand shock as discussed later. However, the
test is “cleaner” than a cross-sectional test and any sign of bias can be much
more easily determined using existing knowledge from the research litera-
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ture. In addition, I do not need to match employer and employee records to
construct the female proportion in each firm, since firm-level data already
contain a male-female breakdown of employees. Second, the survey covers not
only manufacturing, but a wide range of industries, assuring the generality
of the results. Third, Japan is an ideal country to implement the market test
because a) the male-female wage gap is much larger than in Western coun-
ties, making the market test powerful if the gap is due to discrimination;2 and
b) the Equal Employment Opportunity legislation that prohibits discrimina-
tion against women in recruitment, hiring, job assignment, and promotion
became effective in April 1999.3 This weak law enforcement arguably assures
that the estimator is free from endogeneity bias due to feedback from high
profit as a result of higher female employment due to law compliance.
2 Empirical Strategy
2.1 Static Test
2.1.1 Cross-sectional Estimation
I estimate the following equation to examine whether a high proportion of
female employees increases a firm’s profit.
yit = β0+β1x1it +β2x2it +β3x3it + inditβ4+ regitβ5+ yeartβ6+ ci +uit, (1)
2See Antecol (2001) and Blau and Kahn (2003) for international comparisons of the
male-female wage gap.
3The original equal opportunity legislation, effective in April 1986, only required that
employers make an effort not to discriminate against women.
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where subscripts i and t are indexes for firm and year respectively. The
dependent variable yit is a proxy for profitability, defined as operating in-
come/total sales, which is essentially the price-cost margin. Here operating
income is calculated by subtracting the sales cost and overhead cost from
total sales. Unfortunately, operating income does not correspond to eco-
nomic profit without subtracting the opportunity cost of capital. The dis-
crepancy between operating income and economic profit depends on each
firm’s amount of capital. To deal with this issue, I included a fixed assets /
total sales ratio, denoted as x2it in the regression. The variable x1it is the pro-
portion of female employees among the total employees, including part-time
workers. To examine whether the heterogeneity of full-time and part-time
workers affects the result, the female proportion of full-time workers was used
instead of the female proportion of both full- and part-time workers. If dis-
crimination against women exists, then a high female proportion will result
in high profit; accordingly, a positive β1 rejects the null hypothesis of no sex
discrimination. The variable x3it is the age of the firm. Since older firms tend
to hold obsolete capital and the assets/total sales ratio may not capture the
capital in the efficiency unit and older firms may hold higher-level intangible
capital, such as research and development knowledge or an established brand
name, it is important to control for this variable. To capture industrial and
regional heterogeneity and time-specific macro shock, industry dummies, pre-
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fecture dummies, and year dummies are included respectively.4 The variable
ci is the firm-specific, time-constant, and unobserved heterogeneity, and uit
is the idiosyncratic error term.
The assumption
E(uit|x1it, x2it, x3it, indit, regionit, yeart, ci) = 0
and
E(ci|x1it, x2it, x3it, indit, regionit, yeart) = 0
assures that the OLS estimator is unbiased and consistent. The first assump-
tion excludes the situation in which an idiosyncratic shock to the firmfs profit,
such as demand shock, disproportionately affects the number of female and
male employees. For example, if women in Japan are marginal workers in a
firm, and female employment is more quickly adjusted to the idiosyncratic
shock as documented by Houseman and Abraham (1993), then uit and x1it
are positively correlated and the OLS estimator of β1 is upwardly biased.
This bias is serious, since the test may spuriously reject the null hypothesis
of no discrimination against women. Thus, I suggest a remedy for this bias
in the following discussion of the fixed effects estimation.
The second assumption on the conditional expectation of ci is violated
when time-constant, firm-specific heterogeneity is correlated with female pro-
portion. If firm-specific, invariable technology affecting profitability also af-
fects female proportion, or if the firm-specific, high profit factor gives em-
4Industry dummies and regional dummies are allowed to be time variant because a
non-negligible number of observations experiences a change in industry code and location.
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ployers the opportunity to exercise sex discrimination and some employers
discriminate against women, then this second assumption is violated.
2.1.2 Panel Estimation
As discussed before, the variation in female employee proportion across firms
may result not only from a variation in employers’ intent to discriminate
based on sex, but also from variations in firms’ technology or organizational
form. If the firms’ unobserved heterogeneity also affects their profit, then
the female proportion is endogenous; this makes the OLS estimator biased
and the sign of the bias cannot be determined a priori. If factors that affect
female employment proportion other than employers’ intent to discriminate
are time constant, then the endogeneity problem can be resolved by allowing
an arbitrary correlation between ci and female proportion by applying a fixed
effects estimation to (1). The fixed effects estimator identifies the causation
from female employment to profit if xit varies over time by a change in em-
ployers’ practice of sex discrimination or some other factors not correlated
with firms’ profit. More formally, the sufficient condition for the fixed effects
estimator to be unbiased is the strict exogeneity of the independent variables
from idiosyncratic error (i.e., E(uit|x1i, x2i, x3i, indi, regioni, yeart, ci) = 0,
where xi is the vector containing the whole history of xit of individual i.).
This assumption rules out the intertemporal correlation of uit and explana-
tory variables, as well as any contemporaneous correlation. For example,
if the idiosyncratic shock to the profit and female proportion are positively
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correlated, then the market test falsely rejects the null hypothesis of no dis-
crimination. To deal with this endogeneity problem, I include industry-year
dummies based on an arguable assumption that the demand shock each firm
faces is mostly captured by industry- and year-specific shock. If most of
the variation in demand shock across firms is explained by industry- and
year-specific shock, then including this industry-year interaction effectively
removes the presumable upward bias in the fixed effects estimator.
2.2 Dynamic Test
The empirical strategy thus far tests the static implication of Becker (1971)’s
hypothesis. Next, I examine whether firms with a high female proportion
grow faster because non-discriminatory employers earn higher profits than
discriminatory ones, as claimed in Becker (1971). Using the growth of sales
or the number of a firm’s employees as proxies for a firm’s growth, I estimate
following equation:
(yi1999 − yi1992)/yi1992 = γ0 + γ1x1i1992 + γ2x2i1992 + indγ3 + regγ4 + ui, (2)
where yit is sales or the number of employees of firm i and time t, x1i1992
is the female proportion of firm i in year 1992, and x2i1992 is the age of the
firm in year 1992. The industry and prefecture dummies are also included.
The long term implication of Becker (1971)’s hypothesis predicts positive γ1,
thus testing the null hypothesis of γ1 = 0 is our interest. The sample consists
only of those firms that are observed in both 1992 and 1999. To deal with
10
probable sample selection bias, I apply Heckman’s two-step estimation to
(2).
3 Data
I used the basic survey of firms’ activity collected by the Ministry of Economy,
Trade, and Industry (METI) of the Japanese government to implement the
test. The survey is a firm-level census survey that covers all firms that hire
more than 50 employees and hold more than 30 million yen in capital. The
available data cover 6 years, 1992 and every year between 1995 and 1999;
and the sample size is about 25,000 firms for each year. From the data sets, I
extracted each firm’s performance measures, such as total sales, sales cost, or
overhead cost, data on the firm’s employees, such as the number of full-time
employees with sex breakdown, the number of part-time employees with sex
breakdown, the book value of its fixed assets, the year of the firm’s birth,
the prefectural location of the firm, and the three-digit code indicating the
industry in which the firm operates. There were originally 152,857 firm-year
observations in the 6 years of data, but after excluding observations with
missing sales information or inconsistent employee records, there remained
152,774 firm-year observations. The proxy of profitability is the operating
income ratio, defined as (total sales - sales costs - overhead costs)/total sales.
Since this variable takes extreme value due to the very small amount of
total sales, the observations whose operating income ratio was between the
1st percentile and the 99th percentile of its distribution were kept in the
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sample, and there were 149,614 firm-year observations remaining.5 Among
these 149,614 observations, 40 were dropped because only part-time workers
were recorded. This sample restriction reduced the sample size to 149,574
observations with 36,068 companies. This unbalanced panel is the analysis
sample for implementing the static test. On the other hand, the dynamic
test requires the observations at least for the year 1992. The absolute value
of sales and employment growth, which is a proxy for firm growth, takes
extreme value due to the small sales amount in 1992, so the sample is also
restricted to the observations whose sale and employment growth rate lies
below the 99th percentile of its distribution. The remaining 23,182 companies
that satisfy these two restrictions are used in the dynamic analysis.
The survey record unfortunately does not distinguish missing values and
zero, except when a firm did not answer the whole survey. Since replying to
the survey is compulsory due to the Statistics Law and because the METI
exerts its best effort to fill in the missing values with a follow-up phone
survey, missing values are presumably rare. Thus, all values of zero in the
record are treated as actual zeros.
The descriptive statistics of the analysis sample used for the static test
are reported in Table 1. The operating income to sales ratio is 2.42 percent,
which is a standard figure for Japanese data. This number is about one-tenth
of the US figure reported in Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (2002), but it
5It turned out that this sample restriction was critical in order to obtain the following
results.
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is known that the profit rate of Japanese firms is lower than that of US firms.6
The unweighted mean of firmsf sales growth rate was -4.907 percent between
1992 and 1999, reflecting the long-term recession during that period, and
the unweighted mean of employment growth was -1.027 percent accordingly.
The female proportion of each firm’s total employees was 32.1 percent at the
mean.
Table 2 closely examines the yearly labor adjustment. The unweighted
mean of the yearly log employment difference is -0.01; this number implies
that firms have been downsizing their employees by 1 percent annually on av-
erage. An examination of the 10th percentile (0.124) and the 90th percentile
(-0.143) of the distribution, however, shows the large amount of heterogene-
ity in the labor adjustment. The number of female employees declined by 2.3
percent annually at the mean, and this number indicates that female workers
suffered from recession more severely than men during the 1990s. An exam-
ination of the 10th percentile and the 90th percentile of the distribution
reveals that the labor adjustment of female workers was more heterogeneous
than the male labor adjustment. Female workers are more likely to be subject
to employment adjustment probably because they hold less firm- specific hu-
man capital and, accordingly, less relation-specific rent. As evidence of this,
6See, for example, Gugler, Mueller, and Yurtoglu (2002) for an international comparison
of the return to investment. The average annual growth rate of firm values in the US was
0.124 between 1985 and 2000 for 8,591 firms, while the rate in Japan was 0.064 during the
same period for 2,219 firms. Note that Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (2002) restricted
their analysis sample to manufacturing establishments, but the current sample contains
all industries.
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the average tenure in 1997 was 13.3 years among male workers and 8.2 years
among female workers (see Table 16 in of Labour (2002)).
The relationship between the change in log total employment and the
change in log female employment is plotted in Figure 1. If the observation
is on the 45 degree line, the female proportion of total employment did not
change over time. Thus, basically, the deviation from the 45 degree line is
used to identify the coefficient of the female proportion in the fixed effects
estimation. This scatter diagram implies that the data contain sufficient
variation in the female worker proportion over time within a firm. The
regression coefficient of the change in log female employment on the change in
log total employment is 1.219, with a standard error of 0.003. This coefficient
implies that the female proportion increases by 2.2 percent on average when
total employment grows by 10 percent.7
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Static Results
4.1.1 Basic Results
Table 3 Column 1 reports the results of the OLS estimation of the equa-
tion (1). The coefficient for the female proportion is 0.24 (t=2.00). The
7This finding may raise some doubt that the female proportion is endogenous in the
profit equation, since female employment may be more sensitive to demand shock than
male employment. However, when I included total employment as an additional explana-
tory variable in the profit equation as a proxy variable for demand shock, the coefficient
for the female proportion reported in the next section did not change essentially. Those
results are not reported here.
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magnitude of the coefficient implies that a 10 percent increase in the female
proportion increases the profit ratio by 0.024 of a percentage point, while
the average profit rate is 2.42 percent. Table 2, Column 2 reports the re-
sults of the fixed effects estimation. The coefficient for the female proportion
becomes as large as 0.89 (t=4.94), and this magnitude implies that the 10
percentage points rise in the female proportion increases the profit ratio by
0.088 of a percentage point, which is about 3.6 percent of the average profit
rate. The difference between the OLS estimate and the fixed effects estimate
implies a negative correlation between the female proportion and unobserved
heterogeneity. In other words, firms that have a persistently high profit factor
tend to employ fewer women.
This negative association between an unobserved high profit factor and
female proportion seems to contradict the prior expectation that new produc-
tion technology, such as newly developed machines or work organization, may
accommodate women well, and, at the same time, render high profit oppor-
tunities for firms. However, managers in firms with a persistent high profit
factor have more room to choose between higher profits and fewer women in
workplace because they feel less pressure from market competition; and some
of the discriminatory managers choose a combination of less profit and fewer
women. If this is the case, the fixed effects estimator consistently estimates
the effect of discrimination. On the other hand, larger fixed effects coefficients
than the OLS coefficient may result from the strong, positive correlation be-
tween idiosyncratic error and female proportion. Suppose female proportion
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across firms varies due to heterogeneity in the employersf preference for dis-
crimination and the temporary demand shock. As implied by Table 2 and
explicitly discussed in Houseman and Abraham (1993), female employment
is more sensitive to product demand shock. If the employerfs preference for
discrimination does not vary over time, then the source of within variation of
the female proportion is totally temporary demand shock. If this is the case,
the fixed effects estimator is upwardly biased. However, considering the ef-
fect of the equal employment opportunity law enacted in 1986 and the social
atmosphere that welcomed female labor participation during the 1990s, there
is good reason to believe that the preference for female employment among
employers changed during the 1990s. Since both the “more room for dis-
crimination” story and the temporary shock story sound plausible, it would
be fair to claim that the OLS estimators estimate the lower bound of the
causal effect of discrimination on profit and that the fixed effects estimators
estimate the upper bound of the causal effect.
The analysis thus far has ignored the possibility that current positive de-
mand shock increases the current female proportion via more rapid female
labor adjustment. To deal with this potential endogeneity of x1it, I include
industry-year dummies in the regression; the dummies capture the demand
shock as far as demand shock is common across firms operating in the same
three-digit industry in a specific year. Table 2, Column 3 shows the results
of the fixed effects estimation with industry-year dummies. The estimated
coefficient becomes smaller (0.72, t=4.24), and this change from the previ-
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ous fixed effect estimate suggests a positive correlation between the current
industry-year positive demand shock and the female proportion. Roughly
speaking, the 10 percentage point increase in female proportion increases the
profit ratio by 0.07 of a percentage point. Considering the average profit
ratio of 2.4 percent, this magnitude is still not negligible.
The results thus far have treated full-time workers and part-time work-
ers equivalently. Critics may claim that the previous results merely reflect
the causation from a high part-timer proportion to a higher profit because
most of the part-timers are women (about 85 percent in the analysis sam-
ple). To address this possibility, I re-classified workers into four categories:
male full-time workers, female full-time workers, male part-time workers, and
female-part time workers, and created a proportion of each type of workers
in relation to total workers. Column 4 in Table 3 shows the result of the
OLS regression of profit ratio on the full-time female proportion, part-time
male proportion, and part-time female proportion, along with the other ex-
planatory variables. The coefficient for the full-time female proportion is
0.35 (t=2.33), and this result is consistent with the previous finding. The
effects of male and female part-time proportion on profit are not statistically
significant. Even after the correlation between firm heterogeneity and the
explanatory variables is taken into account by the fixed effects estimation,
the coefficient for the full-time female proportion is 0.56 (t=2.80), as appears
in Column 5 of Table 3. The coefficient for part-time female proportion be-
comes as large as 1.24 (t=6.20). This large coefficient might partly reflect the
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fact that firms encountering positive demand shock adjust their labor force
by hiring more female, part-time workers. The result does not change essen-
tially when the industry-year dummies are included, as reported in Column
6 of Table 3. The difference between the OLS estimate and the fixed effects
estimate implies that the full-time, female proportion is negatively correlated
with a firm-specific, persistent high profit factor. This finding perhaps can
be explained by the fact that firms with a persistent high profit factor tend
to hire fewer full-time female workers.
To summarize the results, when the female proportion increases by 10
percentage points, and 30 percent of the workers are women in an average
firm, the profit rate increases by 0.07 of a percentage point, while the average
profit rate is about 2.4 percent, according to the most accepted estimate.
Using semi-elasticity, a 10 percentage point increase in female employment
increases profit by 2.9 percent. This semi-elasticity is comparable to the
US semi-elasticity of 2.1 percent found in Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske
(2002).
To make sense of the size of the estimated most preferable coefficient
of 0.72 (Table 3, Column 3), a thought experiment to calculate the upper
bound of the effect of female proportion on profit rate is useful. Suppose
that the unadjusted male-female wage differential of 0.59 in 1995 is all due
to sex discrimination 8 and male and female workers are perfect substitutes
8According to statistics from the International Labor Office, average monthly earnings
(including bonus payments) of wage earners and salaried employees in the non-agricultural
sector was 496.0 thousand yen for men and 252.8 thousand yen for women, whereas hours
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in production. The ratio of wage bill to total sales is 0.164 in my data. If the
proportion of female is exogenously increased by 10 percentage points while
the proportion of male is decreased by 10 percentage points keeping the out-
put level constant, the profit rate should increase by 0.67 (=0.41*0.164*0.1)
of a percentage point. This number is about nine times as large as the
estimated effect. This result implies that not all of the male-female wage
differential is due to discrimination, since if it were, the estimated coefficient
should have been nine times larger.
4.1.2 Robustness Check: Concentration
The fixed effects results presented in the previous section indicated that
the female proportion of total employment positively affects firms’ profit
rates. However, as mentioned before, the female proportion may change over
time within a firm, due to factors other than a change in the employers’
preference for discriminating against female employees. And if this factor
also affects firms’ profit rates, then the female proportion becomes endoge-
nous. Although I included industry-year dummies to deal with this possible
endogeneity, this may not resolve the endogeneity issue because firm- and
time-specific shocks cannot be removed from the industry-year interaction
dummies. Thus, in this section, I provide circumstantial evidence that im-
plies that the positive effect of the female proportion on the profit rate is not
of work per week was 38.7 for men and 33.2 for women in 1995. Assuming there are 4.33
weeks in a month, the hourly rate of pay is 2.96 thousand yen for men and 1.76 thousand
yen for women.
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a merely spurious correlation.9
According to Becker’s discussion, if firms in an industry face tense market
competition, only non-discriminatory employers survive, since the firms that
do not maximize their profit are immediately kicked out of the market. Thus
we should not find a positive effect of female proportion on the profit rate
among firms that operate in competitive industries. On the other hand, an
uncompetitive market structure leaves room for employers to make choices
on the female proportion and profit rate. Employers choose an optimal mix
of female proportion and profit rate to maximize their utility, and, as a con-
sequence, female proportion should have a positive impact on the profit rate.
I test this prediction by examining whether the effect of female proportion
on the profit rate is larger for firms operating in concentrated industries. As
a proxy for the degree of competition among industries, the Herfindahl index
from 1992 is used.10 The Herfindahl index at the beginning of the survey is
used to avoid possible endogeneity of the Herfindahl index due to demand
shock or other shocks. The analysis sample is divided into four categories
of industries depending on the Herfindahl index in 1992. The first category
includes industries whose Herfindahl index is below the 25th percentile of the
index distribution. The second, third, and fourth categories include indus-
tries between the 25th and 50th percentiles, the 50th and 75th percentiles,
9A similar test was implemented in Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (2002).
10The Herfindahl index is the squared sum of each firm’s market share, defined for
each three-digit industry. The market share is calculated based on each firmfs final goods
shipment. A higher number on the Herfindahl index implies a higher concentration in the
industry.
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and the 75th percentile and above of the index distribution respectively. I
call each category 1. least concentrated industries, 2. less concentrated in-
dustries, 3. moderately concentrated industries, and 4. most concentrated
industries.
The estimation results of the profit function, using each category of the
degree of industry concentration, appear in Table 4. Panel A, Columns 1
and 2, reports OLS and fixed effects estimation results for the sample of
least concentrated industries. Estimated coefficients by both OLS nor fixed
effects are not statistically significant. The inclusion of the part-time and
full-time breakdown does not change the results, as reported in Columns
3 and 4. Panel B reports the estimation results for the less concentrated
industries. Although the estimated coefficient by OLS is not statistically
significant, the estimated coefficient by fixed effects become larger, up to
1.02 with statistical significance (t = 2.68), as reported in Column 2. The
fixed effects results using the full-time and part-time breakdown reported
in Column 4 indicate that the coefficient for part-time female workers is
larger than that of full-time female workers; however, the coefficient for the
proportion of full-time female workers is still as large as 0.77, with marginal
statistical significance (t = 1.83). Panel C reports the estimated results using
the sample from moderately concentrated industries. Focusing on the fixed
effects results reported in Column 2, the coefficient for proportion female is
2.24 (t = 4.67), and this magnitude is even larger than estimated coefficients
from previous samples. The results obtained thus far are consistent with
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the prediction from Becker’s theory: A positive, partial correlation between
female proportion and profit rate should only be found in less competitive
(more concentrated) industries. Panel D reports the estimated results for
the most concentrated industries. The estimated coefficient for proportion
female by the fixed effects is smaller than the previous sample, but it is still as
large as 1.08 and statistically significant (t = 2.51). However some caution is
necessary, since the fixed effects analysis reported in Column 4 using the full-
time and part-time classification indicates that the large estimated coefficient
for proportion female in Column 2 is due to a large coefficient for proportion
part-time female.
To summarize, the analysis with the divided sample by industry concen-
tration found the positive partial correlation between proportion female and
profit rate in less and moderately concentrated industries, but the positive
correlation was not detected in the least concentrated industries. The results
for the most concentrated industries are somewhat mixed, but there was
weak evidence for a positive, partial correlation between proportion female
and profit rate.
The findings obtained using the Harfindahl index implies that the positive
correlation between female proportion and profit rate in the previous section
is roughly consistent with Becker’s employer discrimination theory.
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4.1.3 Robustness Check: Random Growth Model
The fixed effects estimation in the previous analysis allowed for time-invariant,
firm-specific heterogeneity that is arbitrarily correlated with female propor-
tion. However, there is a good reason to suspect that the firm-specific het-
erogeneity in the profit growth rate is correlated with female proportion. As
evidenced in Figure 2, a one percent increase in total employment is associ-
ated with a 1.2 percent increase in female employment on average. Thus, the
female proportion may be high among growing firms and this positive cor-
relation between female proportion and the firm-specific growth rate causes
an upward bias of the fixed effects estimator. To deal with this possibility,
the following random growth model is estimated:
yit = β0+β1x1it+β2x2it+β3x3it+inditβ4+regitβ5+yeartβ6+ci+ait+uit, (3)
where ai is the firm-specific growth rate that may be correlated with ex-
planatory variables in arbitrary ways. The model is estimated by applying
the fixed effects estimation to the data with first difference transformation.
The estimation renders an unbiased and consistent estimator of β if the strict
exogeneity of the idiosyncratic error (i.e. E(uit|xi, indi, regi, yeart, ci, ai) = 0)
holds.
The results of the estimation appear in Table 5. The estimated coefficient
by random growth model becomes larger than the fixed effects estimate. The
estimated coefficient in Column 1 implies that a 10 percentage point increase
in the female proportion increases the profit rate by 0.1 of a percentage point.
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The change in the estimated coefficient from the fixed effects estimate implies
a negative correlation between female proportion and the unobserved, firm-
specific growth rate, ai. This is consistent with the finding in the next section:
The firms with a high female proportion in 1992 were more likely to drop
off from the sample in 1999. Thus females are more likely to be employed
in firms that have low or negative underlying growth rates. However, given
a firm’s low or negative growth rate, hiring more women increases its profit.
The result of the estimation that allows for industry-year specific shock is
reported in Column 2. Although the coefficient becomes smaller as expected,
the result does not essentially change.
The estimation results using the full-time and part-time classification as
explanatory variables that are reported in Column 3 and 4 are interesting.
Once the firm-specific growth rate is allowed to be correlated with female
proportion, the estimation result reported in Column 3 implies that hiring
10 percentage points more full-time female workers increases the profit rate
by 0.95 of a percentage point (t=4.32), when industry-year dummies are
not included. The result is essentially the same even when industry-year
dummies are included, as reported in Column 4.
The estimated results of the random growth model offer additional evi-
dence that a rise in the female proportion increases the profit rate in a causal
sense.
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4.2 Dynamic Results
In this section, I examine whether a firm that hires more women will grow at
faster rate due to higher profit by estimating the equation (2) from the previ-
ous section. If non-discriminatory firms purge discriminatory firms from mar-
kets, then a perfectly competitive market eliminates discrimination against
women as predicted by Becker (1971). Firms that report positive numbers of
sales and employees in both 1992 and 1999 are classified as “survivors” and
are used to estimate the equation (2); in other words, the sample selection
is based on the criteria that firms employed more than 50 employees and
held at least 30 million yen in capital in both 1992 and 1999 and reported
positive numbers of sales and employees. To account for this incidental sam-
ple selection, I estimate the survival probability in 1999 conditioned on the
observation available in 1992 by probit estimation in the first stage; I then
estimate (2) by OLS, including the inverse mill’s ratio calculated from the
first stage probit. Since employment growth or sales growth almost deter-
mines survival, it is logically inconsistent to look for the excluded variables
in the selection equation. Accordingly, I include the same set of variables
in the first stage probit and the second stage OLS; thus it should be noted
that the identification of coefficients in (2) depends on the non-linearity of
the inverse mill’s ratio.
Table 4, Column (1) tabulates the results of the probit regression of sur-
vival in 1999, conditioned on the firms’ characteristics in 1992. The female
proportion negatively affects firms’ survival; a 10 percent increase in the fe-
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male proportion decreases the survival probability by 1.1 percent, while the
survival rate is about 71 percent. However, once survival is conditioned, an
increase in the female proportion positively affects firms’ sales growth, as
shown in Column (2); a 10 percent increase in female proportion increases
firms’ sales by 0.69 of a percentage point (t=1.52), while the average sale
growth rate conditioned on survival is -4.91 percent. The female propor-
tion also positively affects employment growth, although the estimated ef-
fect is not statistically significant (Column (3)). Similar results are obtained
when the detailed re-classification of workers is used as a set of explanatory
variables. Column (4) shows that a 10 percentage point increase in the fe-
male proportion reduces firms’ survival probability by 1.1 percentage points.
Columns (5) and (6) show that the full-time female proportion in 1992 pos-
itively affected both sales and employment growth, but the effects are not
statistically significant.
The results of the growth regression are consistent with the results ob-
tained in the previous analysis; firms with a persistently high profit factor
hire fewer women. If the persistently high profit is due to the market struc-
ture of the industry in which the firm operates or the firmsf non-transferable
technology, then firms without this persistent high profit factor do not nec-
essarily perform better in the long run just because they hire more women
and earn more profit. If the corporate governance structure is such that the
shareholders’ benefit is maximized, then the rent due to market structure
or technology goes to the shareholders, and managers have no room to in-
26
dulge their preference for discrimination. The empirical results in this section
suggest that markets are not competitive enough to eliminate sex discrimi-
nation and corporate governance structures seem to leave room for managers
to enjoy the rent.
5 Conclusion
Becker (1971) proposed the model of employer discrimination, which indi-
cated that a discriminatory employer hires fewer women than would be nec-
essary for attaining the profit maximizing level in order to indulge their
preference for discrimination. This paper examined whether firms with a
higher female proportion earn higher profits in order to test the empirical
implication of this theory. Firm-level, panel data from Japan covering a six-
year period were used to implement the test. The empirical results showed
that a rise in female employment increases the profit ratio, defined by the
operating income/sales ratio. A fixed effects estimation to deal with corre-
lated, unobserved firm characteristics rendered even stronger results: A 10
percentage point increase in female proportion increases the profit rate by
2.9 percent. This result implies that a time-constant, firm-specific high profit
factor is negatively correlated with female employee proportion. This result
supports employer discrimination as an explanation for the male-female wage
gap. The effect of a high female proportion on high profit rate is found to
be stronger in concentrated industries.
Becker (1971)’s employer discrimination hypothesis has a long- run im-
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plication that employers who do not discriminate purge the discriminatory
employers because the former firms earn more profits. This long-run impli-
cation was tested by examining whether the firms hiring more women grow
faster than the firms hiring fewer women. The result of this test indicated
that the initial level of female employment does not induce firm growth,
which is measured by sales growth or growth of the number of employees.
This result is consistent with the negative correlation between the unobserved
high profit factor and female proportion implied by the difference between
the OLS and the fixed effects estimates. Even if a non-discriminatory firm
hires more women, the firm’s profit does not necessarily exceed that of a
firm with a persistent high profit factor (e.g., non-transferable technology or
industrial market structure). Taking this negative correlation of persistent
high profit and female proportion into consideration, the long-run implication
of Becker (1971)’s employer discrimination theory does not necessarily hold.
As long as a persistently high profit factor exists and some rent is imputed
to discriminatory employers, the male-female wage gap can be persistent.
The empirical results obtained in this study are interesting because they
suggest a mechanism by which employer discrimination and a male-female
wage gap coexist. Further theoretical and empirical analysis of the reasons
why high-profit firms hire fewer women may be an important future research
topic.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, All Firms, 1992, 1995-1999 
 Mean S.D. 
Operating Income / Sales (%) 2.42 4.12 
Sales Growth Rate (%) 1992-1999 | Survival (N=16377) -4.91 35.08 
Total Employment Growth Rate (%)1992-1999 | Survival (N=16377) -1.03 30.01 
Proportion Full-time Female 0.23 0.16 
Proportion Part-time Male 0.02 0.05 
Proportion Part-time Female 0.09 0.15 
Firm Age 0.34 0.87 
Fixed Assets / Total Sales 35.29 14.41 
Herfindahl Index in 1992 0.03 0.03 
Number of Firms 36070 - 
Number of Observations 149614 - 
Note: The sample includes observations with operating income / sales ratios between the 1st and 
99th percentiles of the distribution. Only for the sales and employment growth rate, the observations 
available for 1992 and 1999 are selected; in addition, observations whose sales and employment 
growth rate lie below the 99th percentile of the distribution are kept in the sample. 
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Table 2: Labor Adjustment during the 1990s: 1992, 1995-1999, Pooled 
 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation
Median 10th 
Percentile 
90th 
Percentile 
N 
∆ Log Total -0.01 0.18 -0.01 -0.14 0.12 113529
∆ Log Total (Weighted) -0.02 0.21 -0.02 -0.14 0.10 113529
∆ Log Female -0.02 0.30 -0.02 -0.27 0.21 113529
∆ Log Female (Weighted) -0.04 0.32 -0.03 -0.25 0.16 113529
Note: Firm size before labor adjustment is used as the weight for weighted statistics. The sample is 
restricted to those firms observed in two consecutive years. 
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Table 3: The Determination of Profit Rate (Operating Income / Total Sales, Percentage)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Model OLS FE FE OLS FE FE 
Proportion Female 0.24 0.89 0.72 - - - 
 (0.12) (0.18) (0.17)    
Proportion Full-time Female - - - 0.35 0.56 0.45 
    (0.15) (0.20) (0.19) 
Proportion Part-time Male - - - -0.41 0.32 0.16 
    (0.30) (0.26) (0.26) 
Proportion Part-time Female - - - 0.13 1.24 1.01 
    (0.14) (0.20) (0.19) 
Firm Age -0.01 - - -0.01 - - 
 (0.00)   (0.00)   
Fixed Assets / Total Sales 0.19 -0.10 -0.09 0.19 -0.10 -0.09 
 (0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 5.30 2.93 3.06 5.29 2.98 3.10 
 (1.30) (1.15) (0.69) (1.30) (1.15) (0.69) 
Ind. * Year Dummies No No Yes No No Yes 
R2 0.11 - - 0.11 - - 
Number of Firms 36070 36070 36070 36070 36070 36070 
Number of Observations 149614 149614 149614 149614 149614 149614 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses under the regression coefficients. OLS standard errors are 
robust against panel clustering. All specifications include three-digit industry, prefecture, and 
year dummies.  
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 Table 4: The Determination of Profit Rate:  Sample Division by Concentration 
Panel A: Least Concentrated Industries (Harfindahl Index is less than the 25th percentile) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
Proportion Female 0.36 0.31 - - 
 (0.25) (0.35)   
Proportion Full-time Female - - 0.58 0.21 
   (0.34) (0.40) 
Proportion Part-time Male - - -0.53 0.23 
   (0.63) (0.48) 
Proportion Part-time Female - - 0.23 0.39 
   (0.25) (0.36) 
Observations 27285 27285 27285 27285 
Number of Firms 5719 5719 5719 5719 
R2 0.12 - 0.12 - 
 
Panel B: Less Concentrated Industries (Harfindahl Index is equal to or more than the 25th percentile 
and less than the 50th percentile) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
Proportion Female 0.29 1.02 - - 
 (0.27) (0.38)   
Proportion Full-time Female - - 0.45 0.77 
   (0.33) (0.42) 
Proportion Part-time Male - - 0.52 0.98 
   (0.82) (0.65) 
Proportion Part-time Female - - 0.05 1.32 
   (0.33) (0.44) 
Observations 31033 31033 31033 31033 
Number of Firms 6512 6512 6512 6512 
R2 0.15 - 0.15 - 
Note: The same note applies as appears in Table 3. 
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Panel C: Moderately Concentrated Industries (Harfindahl Index is equal to or more than the 50th 
percentile and less than the 75th percentile) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
Proportion Female 0.70 2.24 - - 
 (0.34) (0.48)   
Proportion Full-time Female - - 0.67 1.47 
   (0.42) (0.53) 
Proportion Part-time Male - - -0.78 0.72 
   (0.78) (0.76) 
Proportion Part-time Female - - 0.76 3.37 
   (0.43) (0.57) 
Observations 25766 25766 25766 25766 
Number of Firms 5246 5246 5246 5246 
R2 0.14 - 0.14 - 
 
Panel D: Most Concentrated Industries (Harfindahl Index is equal to or more than the 75th 
percentile) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
Proportion Female -0.44 1.08 - - 
 (0.27) (0.43)   
Proportion Full-time Female - - -0.64 0.35 
   (0.30) (0.46) 
Proportion Part-time Male - - -0.63 0.32 
   (0.83) (0.72) 
Proportion Part-time Female - - -0.08 2.31 
   (0.36) (0.50) 
Observations 29729 29729 29729 29729 
Number of Firms 6053 6053 6053 6053 
R2 0.11 - 0.11 - 
Note: All specifications include firm age, fixed assets / total sales, three-digit industry, prefecture, 
and year dummies as additional control variables.
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 Table 5: The Determination of Profit Rate: Random Growth Model   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model Random 
Growth 
Random 
Growth 
Random 
Growth 
Random 
Growth 
Female Ratio 1.05 0.94 - - 
 (0.20) (0.20)   
Female Full-time Ratio - - 0.95 0.86 
   (0.22) (0.22) 
Male Part-time Ratio - - 0.41 0.36 
   (0.29) (0.28) 
Female Part-time Ratio - - 1.23 1.07 
   (0.23) (0.22) 
Fixed Assets / Total Sales -0.14 -0.12 -0.14 -0.12 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 2.60 3.99 2.60 3.99 
 (1.86) (2.45) (1.86) (2.45) 
Ind. * Year Dummies No Yes No Yes 
Observations 113544 113544 113544 113544 
Number of Firms 30601 30601 30601 30601 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All specifications include three-digit industry, prefecture, 
and year dummies. The fixed effects estimation was applied to first differenced data. The sample is 
accordingly restricted to observations available for two consecutive years and T>=3. 
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Table 6: The Determination of Sales Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable (%) Survival Sales Emp. Survival Sales Emp. 
Model Probit Heckit Heckit Probit Heckit Heckit 
Value in 1992       
Proportion Female -0.11 0.90 -4.10 - - - 
 (0.02) (4.55) (3.97)    
Proportion Full-time Female - - - -0.11 -0.54 -8.20 
    (0.02) (4.82) (4.20) 
Proportion Part-time Male - - - -0.11 21.14 -25.34 
    (0.08) (7.96) (6.93) 
Proportion Part-time Female - - - -0.10 17.30 3.65 
    (0.03) (4.58) (3.99) 
Firm Age 0.004 -0.47 -0.31 0.004 -0.45 -0.32 
 (<0.000) (0.14) (0.12) (0.000) (0.14) (0.12) 
Inverse Mill’s Ratio - -7.15 5.86 - -5.95 2.91 
  (26.10) (22.75)  (25.96) (22.66)
Number of Observation 23182 23182 23182 23182 23182 23182 
Note: All specifications include three-digit industry dummies and prefecture dummies. Marginal 
effects are reported for the probit estimation. The standard errors are in parentheses. Heckit 
estimates are two-step estimates that use the probit estimation reported in columns (1) and (4) as 
the first stage, probit regression. The sample is restricted to those observations whose sales 
employment growth rates are below the 99th percentile of the distribution. Among the 23,182 
firms in 1992, 16,377 firms were observed in 1999. 
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Figure 1: The Change in Log Total Employment and Log Female Employment 
 
 
 
 
